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that this style is more likely to violate the right of privacy than conventional newspaper reporting 34 and is a proper factor for consideration in a privacy action. Since the purpose for using the "story"
style of writing is to make the article more sensational in order to
attract additional readers, the publisher by this action has ceased to be
concerned primarily with giving news to the public, and has concerned himself more with obtaining a profit at the expense of the
plaintiff's feelings. Moreover, the fictional style aggravates the injury
to the plaintiff's feelings because its inherent vividness attracts a wider
reading public and leaves a more lasting impression.
In Aquino, the court properly considered the right of privacy in
light of modern views and decisions. It applied the decency test by
weighing the value of the article as news against the invasion of the
plaintiff's privacy. While the court examined the article as a whole,
the fictional style was treated as an important element in reaching its
decision. By using this method, the court concluded that the right of
privacy can be invaded by a wrongful presentation of privileged material.
E. J. SULZBERGER, JR.

VENDOR'S LIABILITY WITH REGARD TO
SALE OF INTOXICANTS
"Evils of intoxication are on record as far back as Noah."' Notwithstanding, the question remains as to where responsibility for this
evil should be imposed. The overindulger may be held liable for his
own acts in both criminal 2 and civil proceedings; a more difficult
problem is whether liability also attaches to the person who serves
intoxicating liquor to a minor or an already intoxicated adult, who
subsequently causes damage to persons or property. With regard to this
problem it has been asserted that the burden should be placed on the
vendor of the liquor rather than on the injured parties or the gen4
eral public, since the consumer is often judgment-proof.
Two methods are used to impute liability to a tavernkeeper. First,
under Dram Shop or Civil Damage Acts in force in twenty jurisdicuIbid.
'State ex rel. Joyce v. Hatfield, 179 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754, 756 (1951).
-Slough, Some Legal By-Products of Intoxication, 3 Kan. L. Rev. 181 (1955).

3McCoid, Intoxication and Its Effect Upon Civil Liability, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 38
(1956).
'Note, 8 Syracuse L. Rev. 252 (1957).
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tions,5 the injured party is given a direct cause of action against the
vendor of the liquor which is tantamount to imposing absolute liability.6 In the absence of such a statute, liability can only be imposed
by the use of common law tort principles. The overwhelming weight
of authority holds that the seller is not liable because the proximate
7
cause of the injury is the drinking, not the selling, of the liquor.
This reasoning has undergone some modification. 8 An action has
been allowed to a personal representative when it was obvious that
there had been a complete, and perhaps wanton, disregard for the
welfare of the overindulgent decedent, who could not even take care
for his own self-preservation. 9 Also, a wife has been allowed to recover
from a vendor, who, over her protest, sold liquor to her husband with
knowledge that he was an habitual drunkard.' 0
Beyond these modifications, the common law rule of non-liability
has been clearly abandoned in several jurisdictions. In Pennsylvania,
which recently repealed its Dram Shop Act, the violation of a liquor
statute was used in an ordinary tort action" to establish negligence
when the' plaintiff was injured by a fellow patron. 2 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached the same result in Waynick v.
5A list of states currently having such statutory enactments can be found in 4
S.D.L. Rev. 149 n.2 (1959).

cSee Prosser, Torts § 61, at 345 (2d ed. 1955). This absolute liability is criticized
in 4 Vill. L. Rev. 575 (g5g).
TFleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959);
Noonan v. Galick, 19 Conn. Supp. 308, 112 A.2d 892 0955); Howlett v. Doglio,
402 I11. 311, 83 N.E.2d 708 (1949); Duckworth v. Stalnaker, 68 W. Va. 197, 69 S.E.
850 (igio). See generally Annot., i3o A.L.R. 352 (1941).
8
One modification more apparent than real, occurred in California recently.
There a cause of action was permitted under a unique view of proximate cause:
that the drinking and the selling merged to become the proximate cause of the accident. Cole v. Rush, 271 P.2d 47 (Cal. 1954). However when the trial court sustained for the second time a demurrer to the complaint, the California Supreme
Court in affirming, ignored the merger theory. Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d
450 (955)"Nally v. Blandford, 291 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1956); Ibach v. Jackson, 148 Ore. 92,
35 P.2d 672 (1934)"0Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz, 104 P.2d 147 (1940). This case relied on an analogy
between liquor and drugs. See 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. 91 (1940), for a note supporting
this approach. In the same vein, it has been held that a wife has a direct action
against the vendor for the loss of consortium due to habitual intoxication. Swanson
v. Ball, 67 S.D. 161, 29
1

o

N.V. 482 (1940).

Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1954). This case is criticized in 20 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 876 ('959) as being judicial legislation.
2Other states have allowed such an action when the plaintiff was injured by a
fellow patron, but on analysis they seem to turn on the duty owed an invitee, rather
than the violation of a liquor law. Cherbonnier v. Rafalovich, 88 F. Supp. 900
(D. Alaska 195o); Thomas v. Bruza, 311 P.2d 128 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Adamson
v. Gand, 93 Ga. App. 5, 90 S.E.2d 669 (1955).
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Chicagd's Last Dep't Store 3 by finding the defendant negligent in
selling liquor to an already intoxicated adult in violation of an Illinois statute making the sale a criminal offense. In both cases the
troublesome proximate cause question was disposed of by holding that
the selling was the proximate cause of the injury. In view of these decisions, it would appear that the non-liability of the tavernkeeper under traditional tort theories is not so clearly established as language in
the cases would seem to indicate.
The most recent case dealing with the problem is Rappaport v.
Nichols,14 which presented for the first time since New Jersey repealed
its Dram Shop Act in 1934 the problem of whether the intervening
negligence of the minor superseded the alleged negligence of the
tavernkeeper. Nichols was served liquor under circumstances that
gave notice that he was a minor and could not be legally served.
Nichols became intoxicated and later negligently killed the plaintiff's
son in an automobile accident. In the plaintiff's action against Nichols
and the persons who served liquor to him, the lower court held, as
a matter of law, that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. 5
The supreme court reversed and remanded.
The court based the tavernkeeper's negligence on two grounds.
First, the act of the tavernkeeper violated a statute forbidding the
sale of liquor to minors or apparently intoxicated adults. Although the
violation of a criminal statute is ordinarily only some evidence of negligence in New Jersey, 16 the court cited Schelin v. Goldberg,17 in which
a negligence per se rule was applied under common law principles,
just as it has been in Pennsylvania since the repeal of its Dram Shop
Act.'S
The second basis was the implied use of traffic accident statistics' 9 to show that the tavernkeeper could foresee that he was helping
to create an unreasonable risk of harm to third persons because of the
carelessness of an intoxicated person. However, the facts as presented
F_-69

F.2d 322 (7 th Cir. 1959).

1131 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
n5However, the appeal "addresses itself entirely to the issue of whether the
plaintiff's complaint against the tavern keepers sets forth a common law cause of
action grounded on negligence." 156 A.2d at 4.
'(Evers v. Davis, 86 N.J.L. 196, 90 Al. 677 (1914). Prosser, Torts § 3o at 122
(2d ed. 1955) states this to be the rule of the case. For a different interpretation of
the case, see Note, 32 Colum. L. Rev. 712 (1932).
1.188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958).
"McKenney v. Foster, 391 Pa. 221, 137 A.2d 502 (1958); Manning v. Yokas,
389 Pa.
x36 132 A.Rd 198 (1957).
1
This has the prior support of the New Jersey Supreme Court. Bohn v. Hudson
& Manhattan R., x6 N.J. i8o, io8 A.2d 5 (1954).
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in the opinion do not show that the defendant had either actual 20
or constructive 2l knowledge that Nichols would be driving a car.
After establishing the negligence 22 of the defendants, the court
considered the question of proximate cause. The court on this point
simply stated that the defendant's negligence could be the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury. Although this is a departure from the
conventional approach, 23 there are several valid reasons for the deviation.
Undoubtedly the liberal position 24 of the New Jersey courts with
regard to the outer limits of liability is an important factor. Lutz v.
Westwood Transp. Co. 25 enunciated the liberal approach as follows:
"The obligation to respond in damages for negligent acts is
not limited to those injuries and damages or consequences which
might reasonably have been anticipated. At present the tortfeasor is generally answerable for an injury that results from
'20
his wrongful act in the ordinary course of events."

Another factor explaining the deviation is the extremely restrictive
definition of superseding cause followed in New Jersey. In determining
whether an intervening cause superseded the defendant's liability,
the New Jersey court in Daniel v. Gielty Trucking Co. 27 stated:
"It is a superseding cause, whether intelligent or not, if it
so entirely supersedes the operation of the defendant's negligence that it alone, without his neglifgence contributing thereto
in the slightest degree, produces the znjury., 28
In the light of this liberal definition of proximate cause, and this
restrictive definition of superseding cause, the Supreme Court of New
'In Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949),
a cause of action was not allowed, even though defendant sold liquor to a minor
knowing he would drive a car and the minor later injured the plaintiff.
'Constructive, in the sense that the roadhouses involved were located at some
distance from a populated area, and therefore the tavernkeeper could foresee that
customers would arrive by automobile.
-This is a prerequisite to any successful action for negligence. While New
Jersey has not adopted the elements of a cause of action as set forth in Restatement,
Torts § 281 (1948), liability is imposed within the limits of this general principle.
See Hoff v. Public Serv. Ry., 91 N.J.L. 461, 1o3 Ad. 209 (9 18).
nSee note 7 supra and accompanying text.
21See Hartman v. City of Brigantine, 42 N.J. Super. 247, 126 A.2d 224 (App. Div.
1956), aff'd, 23 N.J. 530, 129 A.2d 876( 1957); Mitchell v. Friedman, ii N.J. Super.
344, 78 A.2d 417 (App. Div. 1951); Mulquinn v. Lock Joint Pipe Co., 12 N.J. Super.
467, 8o A.2d 634 (App. Div. 1951).
- 3 1 N.J. Super. 285, 1o6 A.2d 329 (App. Div. 1954), cert. denied, x6 N.J. 205,
1o8 A.2d 120 (954).
Mio6 A.2d 329, 331 (1954). (Emphasis added.)
- 1 16 N.J.L. 172, 182 Atl. 638 (1936).
9182 At. 638, 639 (1936).

